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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78^2(3)(j)(2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial court correctly rule on summary judgment that Ray Burrows 
acted consistently with the broad gifting powers granted to him in a Durable Power of 
Attorney for Asset Management, and with any fiduciary duty he had thereunder, when 
he distributed personal property items to all eight children of Ralph and Ida Burrows by 
gifting to them said personal property in equal shares. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Questions of whether the correct legal standards 
were applied are questions of law and are reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: This case 
involves an agent's ability to gift personal property pursuant to a Durable Power of 
Attorney for Asset Management which expressly grants the agent such gifting powers 
and which powers are exercised consistently with the agent's fiduciary duty and the 
principal's integrated overall estate plan. The trial court denied Eagar's Motion for 
1 
Partial Summary Judgment which sought to have the personal property items returned to 
the estate, and granted Appellees' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing 
Eagar's Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
In addition to the facts set forth in Appellant's Brief, Appellees provide the 
following additional facts for the Court's consideration: 
1. Following the death of Ralph Burrows on September 23, 2002, the children 
of Ralph and Ida Burrows were faced with making numerous decisions relative to Ida 
Burrows' care and asset management. (R. 109, 118, 143, 160).* 
*Ray Burrows is in fact one of the sons of Ralph and Ida Burrows. As further 
clarification, he is the natural son of Ralph Burrows, and the step-son of Ida Burrows. 
Ralph and Ida Burrows were married for 43 years, prior to the death of Ralph. Ray was 
28 years old at the time of Ralph and Ida's marriage on June 11, 1959, Ron was 
approximately 26, Linda 14, Art 23, Julia 17, Florence 24, Eagar 20, and Bill 24. (R. 
170). For 43 years, Ray was in all respects considered a son of Ida, just as Eagar was 
considered a daughter of Ralph. (Id.) All eight children were considered sons and 
daughters of both Ralph and Ida, without regard as to who was a natural child, and who 
was a step-child. (R. 171). Regardless of any technical legal interpretation of the word 
"issue" as contained in Ida's will, based on personal experience, the facts and 
circumstances surrounding Ida's declining health and eventual passing, as well as 
statements made by Ida prior to her death, it is clear that Ida intended all eight children 
to have a share in any personal property items that belonged to her. Her intention is 
based on, but not necessarily limited to, the following factors: (a) She gave Ray 
unlimited power of attorney to make any and all decisions relative to her health care, and 
relative to asset management including her personal property items, and no such power 
of attorney was given to Ida's natural children; (b) There were times when Ida expressed 
profound frustration with regard to her natural children, Eagar and Bill, including stating 
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2. As part of an integrated estate plan, all of the following were executed on 
the same date (October 2, 1997): Ralph's will (Addendum 3 to Appellant's Brief; R. 18-
30); Ida's will (Addendum 2 to Appellant's Brief; R. 32-44); Ralph and Ida's trust 
(Addendum 4 to Appellant's Brief; R. 46-64); Eagar's limited power of attorney for 
medical decisions (Addendum 1 hereto; R. 140); Ray's Durable Power of Attorney for 
Asset Management, which included a medical power of attorney as well (Addendum 5 to 
Appellant's Brief; R. 124-25). 
3, Ralph and Ida's wills reference the preparation of a memorandum to direct 
the distribution of their personal property, which the undisputed facts demonstrate no 
on a number of occasions that she wanted to disown Bill, that she had lost both Eagar 
and Bill, and that she was very hurt and had a broken heart relative to Eagar and Bill; 
and (c) During the 43 years of Ida's marriage to Ralph, she often and continuously stated 
that she considered Appellees all her children, without any distinction between natural 
children and step children. (Id.) Ida's feelings toward treating the children equally is 
corroborated by all eight children receiving an equal distribution under the Trust, and all 
eight children being listed in each of Ralph's and Ida's wills as living beneficiaries. (Id.; 
see also copies of the Trust and Wills attached as Addenda 2, 3, and 4 to Appellant's 
Brief). Specific evidence relating to Ida's frustration with Eagar and Bill was submitted to 
the trial court. (See R. 171-72, 182-85). Eagar undoubtedly disputes many of these 
facts, but they do not constitute material facts that prevented summary judgment in favor 
of Appellees. They merely serve to underscore that there was ambiguity as to what Ida 
intended the word "issue" to mean in the context of distribution of personal property as 
set forth in her will, i.e. whether a technical statutory definition of "issue" applied, 
restricting distribution of her personal property to two of the eight children (Eagar and 
Bill), or whether all eight children should each receive an equal share, consistent with 
the overall estate plan. 
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such memorandum was ever prepared by either. (Addendum 1 to Appellant's Brief; R. 
27). 
4. The Durable Power of Attorney for Asset Management (hereinafter simply 
Tower of Attorney") expressly grants Ray broad powers to perform the following, among 
other things: 
to bargain and agree for, buy, sell, mortgage, hypothecate, and in 
any and every way and manner deal in and with goods, wares, and 
merchandise, chooses in action, and other property in possession or in 
action, and to make, do, and transact all and every kind of business of 
what nature or kind soever, including all business related to accounts in 
financial institutions. Also to gift property, whether real or personal, or 
sums of money or any other items belonging to IDA B, BUROWS [sich 
and also for IDA B. BUROWS [sic] and in her name and as her act and 
deed, to sign, seal, execute, deliver, and acknowledge such deeds, 
covenants, indentures, agreements, mortgages, hypothecations, bottomries, 
charter parties, bills of lading, bills, bonds, notes, receipts, evidences of 
debt, releases, and satisfactions of mortgage, judgment, and other debts, 
and such other instruments in writing of whatever kind and nature as may 
be necessary or proper in the premises. 
(Addendum 5 to Appellant's Brief; R. 124) (emphasis added). 
5. The Power of Attorney granted to Ray also contained the following 
provision, relative to Ray's acts being legally considered the acts of Ida: 
GIVING AND GRANTING unto RAYMOND R. BURROWS, said 
Attorney, full power and authority to do and perform all and eveiy act and 
thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the 
premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as IDA B. BUROWS [sic] 
might or could do if personally present herself, thereby ratifying and 
confirming all that her said Attorney RAYMOND R. BURROWS, shall 
4 
lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents. 
(Id.; R. 125). 
6- In addition to having the broad power to make decisions relative to Ida's 
personal and other property, as the Power of Attorney granted to Ray was expressly 
entitled "for asset management," it also included the following language relating to 
medical care decisions: 
Also to make decisions with respect to the medical care of Ida B. Burrows 
and all other matters concerning her health, including, but not limited to, 
choosing health care providers, making determinations with respect to the 
nature and location of such care, and the execution and delivery of all 
documents, contracts, and agreements in connection with such health care 
related decisions. 
(Id.; R. 124). 
7. Eagar was not given such broad control over Ida's assets, but was only given 
a limited "Power of Attorney" to make medical decisions, which merely stated she was 
authorized "to execute a health care directive on [Ida's] behalf under Section 75-2-1105, 
governing the care and treatment to be administered to or withheld from [her] at any 
time after [she] incur[s] an injury, disease, or illness which renders [her] unable to give 
current directions to attending physicians and other providers of medical services." 
(Addendum 1 hereto; R. 140). 
8. In addition to Ray's power to act as Ida's agent under the Power of 
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Attorney Ida granted to him, Ray was also to serve as the successor/substitute personal 
representative to Ralph's estate under Ralph's will (Addendum 3 to Appellant's Brief; R. 
26), and as successor co-trustee under Ralph and Ida's trust. (Addendum 4 to 
Appellant's Brief; R. 48). 
9. Following Ralph's death, significant assets, including a car, truck, house and 
lawn mower were all sold and the money deposited into the Burrows Trust for Ida's care 
and well being. (R. 109, 118, 145, 161). 
10. In order to reasonably and properly consider the management of certain 
remaining assets, including the personal property at issue in this case, the majority of the 
children of Ralph and Ida Burrows considered and discussed the following factors: 
a* the pros and cons of spending money to place the personal property 
into storage; 
b. the pros and cons of leaving the personal property in the home 
untouched and open to possible theft, damage, or loss; and 
c. the pros and cons of paying utilities and upkeep for an unoccupied 
home, depleting assets of the estate, when it was clear that Ida's health would not permit 
her to remain in the home alone. (R. 109, 11849, 14546, 162).2 
2These facts and some of those which follow are not materially disputed by Eagar. 
Consistent with Bluff dak City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25 (Utah App. 2007), such facts 
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are therefore deemed admitted. 
Furthermore, Eagar asserts that "[t]here is no evidence that Ida was terminally ill 
nor that she was fully incapacitated at the time Ray gifted away her personally property." 
Appellant's Brief at 8 n. 2. To the contrary, there was considerable evidence of same in 
this case. Prior to Ralph's surgery which resulted in learning that he suffered from a 
terminal condition, Ida had been living with Ralph in their marital home, and Ida was 
under Ralph's care. Nevertheless, just because Ida was at home did not mean that she 
was fine and could take care of herself. Ralph was her caretaker. Ida was often very 
confused, and difficult to care for. Eagar was not familiar with her mother's state of 
health, and need for assistance with her care, because Eagar rarely if ever went to the 
home and visited her mother. (R. 173). During the time of Ralph's hospitalization, Ida's 
medications and bladder infections were recurring problems. (Id.). At the time of Ida's 
admission into Alta View Hospital, nobody knew how long her hospital stay would be, or 
what circumstances her hospitalization would involve. (R. 174) • 
Contrary to Eagar's assertion that Ray did not allow Ida to return home, the fact is 
that Ida was completely unable to go back to the house, was unable to collect any 
personal property items, and was unable to make any decisions on her own. Ida's inability 
to return to the house was supported by medical opinion. The hospital recommended 
that Ida be transferred to Health South for more long term care, and from there decide 
what future health care she might need. Ida was transferred to Beehive House at Eagar's 
request, where she remained for three (3) weeks. Ida was then hospitalized twice, and 
Beehive House told the children that they could not take Ida back — she was not able to 
sustain herself, or take care of her own basic needs, and that she also disturbed the other 
patients. At that time, Ida could not be returned to the house because she needed 
around-the-clock care. (R. 174). She was 89 years old at the time, and had been 
diagnosed with dementia (as per Dr. Bennett). (R. 177). 
Moreover, Eagar points out that Ida lived for nearly three years after the gifting 
took place. Appellant's Brief at 8 n. 2. Eagar fails to point out, however, that Ida was 
never released from a care center, and lived there three years until her death. (See R. 
292 at page 10). Such circumstances factually corroborate Ida's incapacity. 
Regardless of the foregoing, Ida's terminal illness and/or incapacity were never 
raised as disputed facts preventing summary judgment against Eagar at the trial court 
level, as the Power of Attorney was self-executing. It did not require Ida's incapacity to 
become effective, though it preserved the agent's power in the event she eventually 
became incapacitated, therefore illness and capacity issues were not material to 
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11. Ray conducted, pursuant to the Power of Attorney granted to him by Ida, a 
drawing for the personal property on or about October 5, 2002. (R. 10940, 119, 146-47, 
163). 
12. Each of the eight children drew numbers, and were then allowed in turn, to 
select personal property items they each desired. (R. 109, 119). 
13. Eagar participated in the drawing and received numerous items of personal 
property, including a set of Wilford Woodruff journals believed to have a value in excess 
of $6,000. (R. 110, 119, 147,163). 
14- The personal property items that were gifted to the eight children through 
the random drawing included: needlepoint pictures, rocker, chest of drawers, firearms, 
book case, 3-legged table, Christmas tree, books, mirrors, clock, snow blower, leaf blower, 
lamps, watches, pillows, dishes, music box, and many other items. (See document listing 
the items drawn by the children, attached hereto as Addendum 2; R. 127-28). 
15. Two children not present at the distribution of personal property were 
represented by other children who were present, and selected items on their behalf. (R. 
consideration of Appellee's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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110,119,147). 
16. The personal property items were given to each child with the 
understanding that wherever Ida eventually resided, that if she wanted items returned to 
her, they would be returned for her use until her passing. Upon her death, the personal 
property items would remain with the children who had chosen them. (R. 110, 119, 147, 
164). 
17. Following the death of Ida,3 at the time of her viewing, Eagar showed two 
of the children, Florence Webster and Linda Davis, jewelry that belonged to Ida, and 
which had been in Eagar's possession from the time of Ida's initial hospitalization when 
Ralph was in the hospital (R. 110, 119, 147). 
18. Eagar asked Florence to take the jewelry and decide how to share it with 
the other children. (R. 110, 120, 148). 
19. After looking through the jewelry, it was decided that one of the wedding 
ring sets was probably the one that Eagar's father had given Ida, and it was agreed that 
she should have that set. (R. 110, 120, 148). 
3Ralph and Ida were married in 1959, which meant at the time of Ralph's death on 
September 23, 2002, they had been married for more than 43 years. (R. 14). Appellees, 
through counsel, miscalculated the number of years in briefing the issue to the trial court, 
and incorrectly indicated the marriage lasted for more than 45 years. References to the 
length of Ralph and Ida's marriage in this brief shall be to the correct length of their 
marriage, i.e. more than 43 years. 
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20. The rest of the jewelry was distributed to the other children by drawing 
after the funeral, at which Eagar was present and drew an item for her brother Bill 
Whiteley. (R. 11041, 120, 148). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Ray Burrows gifted the subject personal property items to all eight of Ralph and 
Ida's children in a manner consistent with the broad gifting powers granted to him under 
a Power of Attorney, consistent with his roles as co-trustee under the family trust and as 
personal representative under Ralph's will, and consistent with Ralph and Ida's intent as 
reflected in all such documents executed on the same date as an integrated estate 
planning package. Ray did not breach any fiduciary duty, but conducted himself in a fair 
and equitable manner considering all of the circumstances. 
The word "issue" as used in Ida's will under the circumstances of this case is not 
clear and unambiguous in light of the absence of a written memorandum directing the 
distribution of personal property, which her will clearly contemplated. If accepted, 
Eagar's position logically would require that if Ida had predeceased Ralph, all of the 
personal property from the 43-year marriage of Ralph and Ida, would have gone solely to 
Ralph's "issue" (Ray and Ralph Burrows) to the exclusion of the remaining children - a 
result that would be equally unfair and inconsistent under the overall estate plan. All of 
the cases cited by Eagar in support of her position are factually distinguishable in that 
10 
they do not involve cases interpreting powers of attorney with gifting provisions relative 
to the distribution of personal property. Case law from Utah and other jurisdictions, as 
well as other legal authorities including the Restatement, support an affirmation of the 
trial court's decision in this case. 
Public policy considerations also strongly favor affirming the trial court's decision. 
Adopting Eagar's position would effectively eliminate anyone's ability to rely on the 
validity of a gifting provision set forth in a power of attorney, which would have broad 
sweeping obvious negative effects. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURTS 
DECISION THAT RAY BURROWS CONDUCTED HIMSELF IN A 
MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE BROAD POWERS 
GRANTED TO HIM IN A DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY 
WHEN HE GIFTED THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF IDA 
BURROWS TO HER EIGHT CHILDREN BY RANDOM 
DRAWING IN EQUAL SHARES. 
Boiled down, Eagar asserts that the tangible personal property of the estate of Ida 
Burrows should be returned to her as personal representative of the estate. The personal 
property at issue in this case, however, was gifted by random drawing, to all of Ida's eight 
children,4 shortly after the death of Ida's husband of 43 years, Ralph Burrows. Each 
4Eagar has previously argued that Ray Burrows is not the son of Ida, and that other 
siblings are not her children. (R. 142 n.l). The relationship of the children to their 
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child, in turn, was given the opportunity to select items of personal property that they 
wanted. 
It is curious indeed, that Eagar's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed with 
the trial court was completely silent as to Ray Burrow's Power of Attorney. It's existence 
was mentioned nowhere. The reason is obvious. Its existence decisively obliterates 
Eagar's claims. Eagar's Complaint contains two causes of action: (1) for return of 
personal property under Utah Code Annotated Section 75-3-708 (duty of personal 
representative to take possession of tangible personal property in the estate); and (2) for 
conversion. Personal property disposed of pursuant to Ray Burrow's Power of Attorney, 
prior to the death of Ida Burrows, is no longer part of the estate over which the personal 
representative has any right of possession after her appointment. In this case, Ray 
Burrows disposed of the personal property on 10/5/02. Ida Burrows died on 9/19/05, 
nearly three years later. Nearly three months later, Eagar was appointed the personal 
representative of Ida's estate. Consequently, Eagar has no legal right as personal 
representative to take possession of personal property that was properly distributed 
pursuant to a Power of Attorney more than three years prior to Eagar's appointment and 
the death of Ida. 
parents is discussed above more fully in footnote 1. 
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The Power of Attorney which Ray Burrows possessed expressly authorized him to 
do all of the following: 
to bargain and agree for, buy, sell, mortgage, hypothecate, and in 
any and every way and manner deal in and with goods, wares, and 
merchandise, chooses in action, and other property in possession or in 
action, and to make, do, and transact all and every kind of business of 
what nature or kind soever, including all business related to accounts in 
financial institutions. Also to gift property, whether real or personal, or 
sums of money or any other items belonging to IDA B, BUROWS [sic], 
and also for IDA B. BUROWS [sic] and in her name and as her act and 
deed, to sign, seal, execute, deliver, and acknowledge such deeds, 
covenants, indentures, agreements, mortgages, hypothecations, bottomries, 
charter parties, bills of lading, bills, bonds, notes, receipts, evidences of 
debt, releases, and satisfactions of mortgage, judgment, and other debts, 
and such other instruments in writing of whatever kind and nature as may 
be necessary or proper in the premises. 
(Addendum 5 to Appellant's Brief; R. 124) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Power of 
Attorney went on to include the language that any acts taken by Ray should be 
considered as though they were acts personally taken by Ida. Specifically, it stated in 
relevant part: 
GIVING AND GRANTING unto RAYMOND R. BURROWS, said 
Attorney, full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and 
thins whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the 
premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as IDA B. BUROWS fsicl 
might or could do if personally present herself, thereby ratifying and 
confirming all that her said Attorney RAYMOND R, BURROWS, shall 
lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents. 
(Id.; R. 125) (emphasis added). 
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It is obvious that Ida trusted Ray to make decisions regarding the management of 
her assets, including her personal property. That is why she gave him the Power of 
Attorney. The level of trust she gave Ray Burrows is emphasized by the fact that she 
granted to Eagar only a limited Power of Attorney to make decisions regarding her 
healthcare, and not a broad power of attorney to manage assets specifically endowed with 
broad gifting powers. (See copy of medical Power of Attorney, attached as Addendum 1 
hereto). Ray had the power to gift the personal property to anyone. He elected to gift 
the property in a fair and reasonable manner -- by drawing with the involvement of all of 
the children. Eagar's participation in a similar manner of distribution of jewelry following 
her mother's death bolsters the fundamental fairness of the 10/5/02 distribution. (See R. 
11041,120,148). 
IL THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL COURTS RULING 
THAT RAY BURROWS DID NOT VIOLATE ANY DUTY OF 
LOYALTY TO IDA. 
Contrary to Eagar's allegation, Ray's agency through the Power of Attorney 
granted to him by Ida is not elevated over Ida's Will. In fact, the exercise of his agency 
was entirely consistent with her Will, with her clear intent as to the distribution of her 
personal property, and with Ralph and Ida's overall estate plan. Leaving aside any 
technical statutory definition of the word "issue," Ida treated all the children as her own, 
and desired to have all property divided among them equally. Ida's Will in and of itself 
14 
is not clear an ' - mind that the 
". - i Il i',' in11"1 mi|fht be a statutorily defined term of art that would exclude numerous 
individuals whom she considered, loved, and treated in all respects as her own children 
for more than 43 years. Obviously she intended "issiu u . ._ 
u.u
 ; ~... .- *\ * \ - i..i.-.-. M-itt planning 
onsistent with her clearly expressed intent. 
The parties hereto have found no Utah appellate case law interpreting the word 
"issue" in a will. One appellate decision outsuk * - iuii, however, has held 11 LIT! I I n ivi n 11 
"issue" does not "1: la x e si icl: : ,„ a •*• :>w j tl: ii J: i t c a t it lot ai: ) \ v id 11:1: le 
ififrniiiHi til ilir testator who uses it." Accordingly, the intent of the testator becomes a 
valid consideration. Newtek v. Mason, 581 A.2d 1269, 1273 (Maine 1990); see also 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 869 P.2d y i i, * - u i . j n . M r . , -v-i * A iicn construing a will, 




 accepted, means that simply because Ralph predeceased Ida, 
all of the personal property items that belonged to Ralph then became Ida's, and then 
upon Ida's death would be distributed n .• nm .. . wo natural cniidren alone, KM I n 
exclusion . : :... . . »M i
 T . ;- <• ^ ,. . j . ., ., wliolc, :i.s 
•iiuMits of fact above, demonstrates that was not Ralph or Ida's intent. 
Ralph and Ida intended to treat all of the eight children equally. If Ida had predeceased 
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Ralph, upon Ralph's death, his children would not have distributed personal property 
items to the exclusion of Ida's natural children. 
Appellees acknowledge that Ida's property was to be used for her benefit. 
Arguably, Ray was at least.empowered to coordinate the distribution of 50% of the 
personal property acquired during the marriage which pertained to his father's estate. 
Appellees recognize the difficulty in determining how such items could be divided in such 
a manner. It is exactly for such reasons — difficulty managing assets and difficulties 
arising from one's incapacity — that powers of attorney are granted. Having been granted 
powers as a cotrustee in the Trust, as the personal representative of his father's estate, 
and as the attorney-in-fact under the Power of Attorney, Ray distributed the personal 
property in as fair and equitable manner as could be determined, given the intentions of 
both Ralph and Ida. Many of the items of personal property had little or no commercial 
value, but those that did, such as the house, vehicles, lawn mower, etc. were sold and the 
monies placed into the Trust. Many items of personal property had significant 
sentimental value, but insignificant commercial value. It was felt that those items should 
remain with members of the family, and to the extent they were eventually determined to 
have any significant commercial value, those amounts could be paid into the Trust by the 
recipients of those items. 
Items belonging to Ida were absolutely for her benefit, and all such decisions made 
16 
with respect to her property were made wv 
i nal property, and after Ida moved into 
Sandy Regional, many of the items were returned to her and placed in her room for her 
benefit, until the time of her death. 'F 11A ^ V 
Ray was not acting in a self-sei \;: ^ 
uir-iiy use best efforts to conduct themselves fairly, 
honestly, and in a manner consistent with the desires of their parents. If Ray were acting 
entirely in his own self interest, instead of conducting a random drawing that permitted 
each of the children to select items uic\ UUL. .:
 r . • •-•;. - \ , i . - i * i 
p o b b L * * i .f f' ! - ' it all for himself, or sold what he 
could and kept the money. In addition, Ray was acting in a manner consistent with a 
strict construction of the Power of Attorney. As set forth above, it expressly grants Ray 
the broad powers, without stated limitations,;::.:.. i.::, • i •• \ r K .v , ^ : 
peiMii inl |JH ipi'i i', in I i I i ill M I s nl K iy ,ln mid hv t o n s i d e r e d t o b e h e r o w n a c t s . (See 
Addendum 5 to Appellant's Brief; see also Kline By and Through Kline v. Utah Dept. of 
Health, 116 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah App. 1989) ("A power of attorney is an instrument in 
writing by which one person, as principal, .: ,, . : P llK 
nl id IHII ' I I I I ! , i n f r m d in iy, b , IIM i i ' in i nf iln i i i s d i nnn f itself, b e g e n e r a l o r 
1
 lie instrument creating this agency relationship is to be strictly 
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construed."). 
As indicated above, the parties to this action have found no case law in Utah that 
is directly on point in this matter. Eagar cites case law from three other jurisdictions in 
support of her position: Alabama, Massachusetts, and Ohio. All of these cases relied on 
by Eagar are readily distinguishable on their facts. 
From Alabama, Eagar relies on Lamb v. Scott, 643 So. 2d 972 (Ala. 1994), and 
Sevigny v. New South Fed, Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 586 So. 2d 884 (Ala. 1991). See page 11 of 
Appellant's Brief. In Lamb, the court was not dealing with an integrated estate planning 
package, but rather interpretation of a will done a year later after a power of attorney had 
been completed, which did not contain any gifting provision, and which dealt with the 
validity of an attorney-in-fact's conveyance of real property (the family farm) solely to 
herself, as opposed to her sharing an equal 1/3 share in the property with the deceased's 
other daughter and stepson. The court properly invalidated the agent's attempted 
conveyance in that case. See Lamb, 643 So. 2d at 973-74. Similarly Sevigny did not deal 
with a power of attorney which contained a gifting provision, but rather dealt with the 
agent's claimed share in various certificates of deposit totaling $315,165. It therefore, 
also did not deal with personal property of questionable commercial value, but rather 
with substantial cash assets. 
Out of Massachusetts, Eagar cites to Gagnon v. Coombs, 654 N.E.2d 54 (Mass. 
18 
App. 1995)? and then string cites to eigm ^ .:M *. u-u v. • i^w 
Apj»t -i *} 'il^.v.* G^grion dealt with a power of attorney 
that had no gifting provision, and which considered the appropriateness of the agent 
conveying to herself an interest in real property. As trustee of a trust she created, she 
conveyed to herself the principal's 184 acre fat mproperi I: i.e cot it I: pi opei ly 
•: x . ..:•*. : ;• »-i\:m. «•!. M
 : ' : r, n^rty in that case. Id. at 56, 63. 
r . t,
 a n c j e v e r y one of the eight cases cited in Eagar's string reference is distinguishable 
for the reason that none involved a power of attorney and were also otherwise factually 
dissimilar on other grounds as well, see jenrus. >n tut; ^  n 
1828)(<le\iliii|'Willi u m v • ; • • " a valuable "homestead farm"); Slices v. 
Inhabitants of Hatfield^ 13 Gray 347 (Mass. 1859) (dealing with claim for compensation 
beyond "tax bills"); American Circular Loom Co, v. Wilson, 84 N.E. I J :•• \Kiass. 
1908) (patent case involving issues of confident^.. •. : . n . . ••i'\ci/<.::ipM»ytv
 v « > n u , \ i -
UUIIK\I\L v, llmvM in, I I" M I " Miss I c>*)£)) (deal i nj'with fiduciary :^:*v of guardian to 
hi.s \\ nrd); IHtrnaii v. Pitman, 50 N.E. 2d 69 (Mass. 1943) (dealing with testamentary power 
of appointment); Berenson v. Nirenstein, 93 N. E. 2d 610 (Mass. 1950) (dealing with 
fiduciary duty between purchaser and broker); Mackey v. I\t n acs l\ 11 ii 111 i 
.: ? ,
 t : ,,. , ! mi iMI I?IJ M. v :J ,. M v s • •* p.'.nrr/employee 
relMti- mshin); OBrien v. Dwight, 294 N.E. 2d 363 (Mass. 1972) (dealing with duties as a 
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fiduciary of a trust). 
From Ohio, Eagar then refers to the following three decisions: In re Estate of Leach, 
2006 Ohio 3755 (Ohio App. 2006); In re Estate of Case, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1378 
(Ohio App. 1998); and Testa v. Roberts, 542 N.E. 2d 654 (Ohio App. 1988). Each of 
these cases is also distinguishable for the fact that none dealt with a power of attorney 
with a gifting provision, and also each dealt with substantial sums of cash assets. See 
Leach, at page 1 (involved $66,439.42 in cash assets); Case, at page 1 (involved 
$66,230.07 in cash assets); Testa, 542 N.E. 2d at 657(involved total of $235,980.19 in 
cash assets; also determined sufficient evidence that principal was not competent to sign 
the power of attorney, which Eagar has admitted there is no evidence Ida was 
incompetent when she signed the Power of Attorney in this case (see Appellant's Brief at 
13)). Obviously, in the case before this Court, Ray has a very clear Power of Attorney 
that expressly granted him gifting abilities. Moreover, the property conveyed under the 
Power of Attorney was not cash assets, but personal property items of little or unknown 
monetary value including such things as needlepoints, furniture, book cases, and the like. 
It is also important to discuss the Restatement provisions cited by Eagar in the 
context of the alleged "self dealing." Appellees do not disagree with the general principle 
that "[a]n agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency." 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 13. The Restatement goes on to describe, however, 
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the cm ""JiiiM.tin i , >n.sid«M,»i'l "r> ""hTpniiiif; the scope of an, agent's authority: 
An authorization is interpreted in light of all accompanying circumstances, 
including among other matters: 
(a) the situation of the parties, their relations to one another, and 
the business in which they are engaged; 
(b) the general usages of business, d le usages of trades or 
employments of the kind to which the ai ithorization relates, and the 
biisiness methods of the principal; 
(c) facts of which the agent has notice respecting the objects which 
the principal desires to accomplish; 
(d) the nature of the subject matter, the circumstances under which 
the act is to be performed and the legality of the act; and 
(e) the formality or informality, and the care, or lack of n i 
which an instrument evidencing the authority is drawn. 
R e s t a t .! • • • *' }IM - r l us provision makes it clear 
: f
 circumstances should be considered when interpreting an agent's authority. T 
this case, Ray is the eldest of eight children, operating as one with several roles: son, 
agent, attorney-in-fact, personal representative, vid * • 11 • i k i 11 i 11\t ,v n ,„ n| in, 
individual ii i, v ol v c: d » > Itl: i a f.3 ) e ai i i: tan iage, at id faced w if:!: i making decisions regarding 
ill! managements of assets, including personal property, relating to that long-term 
marriage relationship. He is not in a business or employer/employee situation, which the 
Restatement provisions cited by Eagar •. R\J: t • y 
!•.. i 5 :i ' * uii overall estate plan. The 
R'. ? .itriiv t»t provisions cited by Eagar are distinguishable on these bases. In fact, the 
comments to § 34 expressly state that "[t]he enumeration in this Section of 
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circumstances which are considered in determining the extent of authority is not 
intended to be exhaustive . . . " and goes on to further state as follows regarding "formal 
instruments": 
Formal instruments which delineate the extent of authority, such as powers 
of attorney and contracts for the employment of important agents, either 
executed on printed forms or otherwise giving evidence of having been 
carefully drawn by skilled persons, can be assumed to spell out the intent of 
the principal accurately with a high degree of particularity... In fact, of 
course, [formal instruments] are construed so as to carry out the intent of 
the principal. There should be neither a "strict1 nor a "liberal1 
interpretation, but a fair construction which carries out the intent as 
expressed. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 34, Comments a and h. The Power of Attorney 
granted to Ray is exactly the type of formal instrument contemplated by the Restatement 
which should be given a fair construction under all the circumstances. It could therefore 
not be considered, in any significant way, to be self-dealing for him to gift personal 
property to all eight children in equal shares, with each child taking turns selecting the 
items they each wanted to receive. 
Moreover, Eagar is curiously silent as to other Restatement provisions which 
clearly support Ray's power to gift personal property items in the manner he did in this 
case. For example, Restatement (Third) Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers) 
§ 6.1 sets forth the requirements applicable to all gifts of property, and which expressly 
allows for gifts by an agent under a durable power of attorney. Id. at Comment I See also 
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Res ta temt 5 ' • M -"'' • *"' - f "' -native Transfers) § 6 . 2 (dealing with 
fjiffs \ >( personal property and discussing in C o m m e n t j gifts by a donor's agent) ; and 
Res ta t emen t (Third) Property (Wills and O t h e r Dona t ive 1 ransfers) <; o.i (dealing witli 
dona t ive transfers by agent under durable power of att r 
Based i • - MH H I ^ , : • •• . -rrectly ruled tha t Ray did no t 
\ ii »|;ii i i (l"i(, ifloynlty to Ida. Even more so, he conduc ted himself in a manner that 
h o n o r e d her intent ions as reflected in he r overall estate plan. 
m T H E T R I A L C Q U R T S D E C I S I Q N S H O U L D A L S O B E AFFIRMED 
B E C A U S E IT I N T E R P R E T E D I D A B U R R O W S ' I N T E N T F R O M 
A N ENTIRE I N T E G R A T E D E S T A T E P L A N N I N G P A C K A G E , 
A N D N O T SOLELY B A S E D U P O N A T E C H N I C A L OVERLY 
N A R R O W D E F I N I T I O N O F T H E W O R D ISSUE" C O N T A I N E D 
I N HER WILL. 
Eagar cites to the 1°2C Utah Supreme Court decision of Huntsman v. * Luntsman, 
192 P. 368 (l m . considerii i,g car icellatiol i ofn lot tgage oi I re al estate at id qi lietii t,g 
udi i, - [|,,i,M '•* pi op. MI IM" llii1 " i J i c the r attorney-in-fact has power to convey 
principal 's property for nominal considerat ion must be Reduc ib le from the language or 
manifest in t en t of the [power of at torney] ins t rument / " Appellant's 13nei at 5 f i l i n g 
Huntsmait, * _ L U ^ I 
HI .,. i ;v : L ttie Court's expressed rule of construction was 
based on the fact the power to convey property by gift was not contained in the power of 
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attorney under scrutiny in Huntsman. More specifically, the Court stated as follows, 
referring to the power of attorney at issue in that case: "The language, vdo make, 
constitute, and appoint Peter Huntsman, of Fillmore City, Millard county, Utah territory, 
my true and lawful attorney, for myself and in my name, place, and stead, and for my use 
and benefit,' is very far from conferring power to give the property away, or convey it for a 
mere nominal consideration." Id. at 370. We have in the present case the exact scenario 
which prevented the Court from reaching a different result in that case, i.e. express broad 
and unqualified gifting authority specifically given to Ray in the Power of Attorney. On 
the facts of the present case, Huntsman becomes a power precedent supporting the trial 
court's decision. 
As Eagar has pointed out, there appears to be no case law in Utah interpreting a 
gifting provision in a power of attorney that is ostensibly at odds with a will provision. 
One very recent appellate decision that provides persuasive authority to affirm the trial 
court's decision in this case is Blin v. Johnson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26977 (W.D. Ky. 
April 11, 2007). In Blin, the court was faced with interpreting a power of attorney that 
granted the attorneys-in-fact (sisters) in that case power to manage the decedent's estate, 
and specifically whether under that power of attorney they were entitled to distribute 
monetary gifts from the estate. Id. at page 1. The court pointed out that the power of 
attorney was silent as to whether the attorneys-in-fact could distribute gifts from the 
24 
decedent's estate. Id. at page _ * ! ' .' • • ^ » » M 1 ; ! !-..; 
\n\vr\ wever, an "utmost good faith" standard was to be 
applied and determined by a factfinder. Id. (citing Wabner v. Blacky 7 S.W. 3d 3379 (Ky. 
1999)), However, after the Wabner decision, the Kentucky legislature enacted a statute 
providing tl lat"[notwithstanding tiny pioviMnnnl l;i\s in ill • i nnii.ii" I ilur.ihl* pnwi i 
: f i XX. : tney may ai itl IOI ize at i. attot i: ley it: I fact to make a gift or the principal's real or 
personal property to the attorney in fact or to others if the intent of the principal to do so 
is unambiguously stated on the face of the instrument." Id. (citing KRS 38b.IV; to;.. 
The issue the court f'aceu v\ai* .. (•••-.-IK J l- " ; 
lanyuiige iimpoM i" tl" :ii in trnry before enactment of the statute. Id. at 3. The court 
observed, correctly, that prior to the statute, "an attorney-in-fact would have been 
authorized to distribute gifts if that were the unambiguous intent oi tiw lower or Attorney 
and clear on the face of the document "  fi I \\ mplm^. in in igm.il i I I 'i \ \ n \ h, 111 
Lrdt "unambiguous written permission to gift is 
required in the Power of Attorney," or no such gifting powers would be implied under an 
"utmost good faith" standard. 





' • -v. so gifts thereunder should be upheld. Like 
in Kentucky, as Eagar points out, Utah passed a law effective May 5, 2003, which 
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required that authority to gift property must be expressly granted in a power of attorney. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-503. Contrary to Eagar's argument, if Ray had gifted the subject 
personal property after the effective date of the statute, it would not be voidable. See 
Appellant's Brief at 18. The Power of Attorney expressly authorized gifting to take place, 
and the Utah statute was now making a requirement what had already been done in this 
case — a written authorization expressly granting the power to make gifts. 
Furthermore, the gifting of the subject personal property in this case is not 
voidable due to a "substantial conflict of interest" under Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-504. 
Ray is only one of eight children, each of whom were treated equally and fairly in the 
distribution of the subject personal property, each receiving an equal opportunity to 
obtain an equal portion of the personal property — a process in which all eight children 
participated. Under such circumstances, there was clearly no "substantial conflict of 
interest." If Ray had attempted to gift all the property to himself, or a limited number of 
the children, Eagar may have a legally sound basis upon which to raise a conflict of 
interest argument. Under the facts of this case, she has no such basis. 
Eagar's reliance on an overly restricted interpretation of conservatorship law also 
provides no convincing support for her position. See Appellant's Brief at 18-19. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-427, "the conservator and the court should take into account 
any known estate plan of the person, including his will, any revocable trust of which he 
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is a settlcii , ; i I at in.. ) c : t 1...1 i a ::t, I i ansfe r, c >t joii it owi lersl lip arrangement with provisions for 
t ur transfer of benefits or interests at his death to another or others which he 
may have originated." (Emphasis added). Such language makes it clear that 
interpretation of the authority granted under a ; < *wei I 
to an < ' , - • * y definition of the word 
VN.-.< • be used therein, but should look at the entire estate plan, including the 
family trust (making it clear that all eight children were to be equal beneficiaries), the 
Power of Attorney, all of wLv n were executed oi. iiu an MUI .US .m mu ^ . *\- . 
plan. under the Power of 
A11 or ney was consistent with the entire estate plan executed on the same date as an 
integrated package of estate planning, and that while Ray was not technically an "issue" 
of Ida, it is cleai uun atic priced substantia* *i a> .R ?: . * »f 
Ai:^:iw\ . , .' s -n < ->\u\' i ' • ^ limit's; Brief at page 3).5 
5Eagar asserts that "the trial court never discussed nor ruled on whether the use of 
the term v issue' in Ida's will was intended to be broader than the statutory definition 
foundin§§ 754-201(5), (9), and (25), Utah Code Ann." Appellant's Brief at 14. The 
trial court may not have expressly addressed the issue, but it certainly did by implication 
when it determined that it was appropriate to look at the entire estate plan to determine 
Ida's intent — the court was not limited to a narrow statutory definition of the word 
"issue" contained in Ida's will 
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With regard to construction of testamentary intent, Eagar has improperly quoted 
the Utah Court of Appeals out of context in Hamilton v. Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971 (Utah 
App. 1994). See Appellant's Brief at 15. The Hamilton court held as follows: 
In construing a will, we are bound by the fundamental principle that 
a "court must look to the testator's intent as expressed in the will.' 
Moreover, if the will is ambiguous, any rule of construction normally used 
in other writings must yield to the intention of the testator as revealed in 
the instrument 
Hamilton, 869 P.2d at 975 (citations omitted). Importantly, the court went on to observe 
as follows, which Eagar has conveniently omitted from the quoted language: 
A testator's intent may be " ascertained not alone from the provision itself, 
but from a scrutiny of the entire instrument of which it is a part, and in the 
light of the conditions and circumstances in which the instrument came 
into existence.' Thus, extrinsic evidence maybe used to ascertain what the 
testator intended. 
Hamilton, 869 P.2d at 975 (citations omitted). Under Hamilton, the trial court's 
consideration of the entire estate plan and the totality of the circumstances, was an 
appropriate consideration in determining that Ray's conduct was consistent with Ralph 
and Ida's intent as reflected by their overall estate plan. 
As the trial court pointed out, both wills provided that there were to be 
memoranda by Ralph and Ida identifying to whom personal property items were to be 
given. Unfortunately, no such memoranda were prepared, which would have eliminated 
much of the difficulty in this case. (R. 292 at 30). Under such circumstances, including 
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the absence of written memoranda unecu; ,. i.-».^?..; 
p r n u • • l did. 
The logical corollary to Eagar's argument suggests that if Ida had predeceased 
Ralph, and she left no memoranda directing the division of personal property, «ii wi ia 5 
personal property would 1 idve Decome Ralph ., JIHI llini il l<'ulpli Irli nnmcmni iiiiliiiii, 
in. L»
 t-i •-, >• * K Anil's two issue (Ray and Ron Burrows), 
to be divided among them as the personal representative (Ray) saw fit in his sole and 
absolute discretiou. Under such a scenario, Eagar could have potentially received none 
of the personal property. Eagai ancu , 
arguing Un 1 <liIi\ 111 i 111 rrpivti\\ i< n 1 < if 1 he estate pijm, and would be arguing for the 
word "issue" to be interpreted broadly, or at least for the other children to receive 
personal property in a manner consistent with the overall estate plan. 
The division of personal property aeeuiiHiLik il Jin mij- <i -fJ^ytMi urni II.IJ.;« 1 In* 
• i' -! '•*'-* [ *•• *' ••: >nu^hjng as fortuitous as who died 
first makes absolutely no sense in light of Ralph and Ida's overall estate plan. Certainly, it 
would have been ideal if both Ida and Ralph had left memoranda describing tlle 
distribution of personal property items, 1 • . , 
pre \ isioi i. as tc > persoi lal property is in: 1 reality tritei ided to d< .il ^ 1t1 \ AM\ remaining minor 
norsenn! n-nwT^' items not included in a memorandum, and/or which may have been 
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acquired by the deceased after the memorandum was created. In the absence of such 
memoranda, it is appropriate to look at their intent as reflected in the overall estate plan, 
and what makes sense under the totality of the circumstances. Gifting the personal 
property items to all eight children by drawing, in equal shares, is consistent with all eight 
children being equal beneficiaries under the trust and is consistent with the broad powers 
granted to Ray under the Power of Attorney. All of Ralph and Ida's personal property 
going to Eagar and Bill is not consistent with their intent as set forth by their overall 
integrated estate plan. 
IV- PUBLIC POLICY ACTUALLY FAVORS UPHOLDING THE TRIAL 
COURTS DECISION IN THIS CASE, THEREBY 
SAFEGUARDING THE ABILITY TO RELY ON THE EXPRESS 
TERMS OF A POWER OF ATTORNEY AND PRESERVING THE 
LONGSTANDING PRINCIPLE THAT SUCH AGENCY SHOULD 
BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED. 
Regarding public policy issues, Eagar argues as follows: 
Applying the policies for fiduciaries found under Utah law, three patterns 
emerge: (1) A fiduciary must act for the benefit of the principal; (2) he 
should not act in a self-serving manner nor make gifts to himself; and (3) 
he should act consistent with the principal's will or general estate plan. In 
the instant case, Ray failed to comply with all three of these policies when 
he failed to act for Ida's benefit by gifting away all of her personal property, 
when he made gifts to himself, and when his gifting was inconsistent with 
Ida's Last Will and Testament. 
Appellant's Brief at 19. As set forth above, it is clear on the facts of this case that Ray 
actually acted in compliance with each of these policies, even assuming for sake of 
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argument they are accurate descriptions of policies relative to fiduciaries. Ray acted for 
the benefit of Ida by honoring the intent behind her overall estate plan, that all eight 
children should be treated equally, and by ensuring that if Ida needed any personal 
property items during the remainder of her natural life following her move into a long-
term care facility, such items of property would be made available to her. As the trial 
court noted, "the personal property distributed by [Ray] constituted gifts that vested at 
the time of the distribution, and the informal undocumented agreement that items gifted 
to others might still be made available for Ida Burrow's use during her lifetime was an 
accommodation to a mother they all cared for." (Addendum 1 to Appellant's Brief; R. 
275-76). 
Ray did not act in a self-serving manner. He gifted the personal property in a fair 
and equal manner. Once again, as the trial court observed in its order: 
3. Burrows did not mismanage the assets of Ida Burrows; 
4- Under the Durable Power of Attorney for Asset 
Management, written in broad terms, Burrows had the authority to dispose 
of Ida: Burrow's personal property essentially in any manner he deemed 
appropriate within the limitations imposed by any fiduciary duties that 
might be applicable; 
5. The manner in which Burrows disposed of the personal 
property was not inherently inequitable, or self-serving, but rather sought to 
deal with all the children equally, as Ralph and Ida Burrows clearly 
intended pursuant to and consistent with their overall estate plan; 
6. The Court notes that Ralph and Ida Burrows' wills referenced 
the preparation of a memorandum to direct the distribution of their 
personal property, which the undisputed facts demonstrate no such 
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memorandum was ever prepared by either; 
7. In the absence of such a memorandum, the Court is satisfied 
that Burrows had the authority under the Durable Power of Attorney for 
Asset Management to distribute the personal property in the manner he 
did; . . . . 
(Addendum 1 to Appellant's Brief; R. 274-75). 
In addition, the facts of this case demonstrate, as discussed more fully above, that 
Ray conducted himself in a manner consistent with Ida's general estate plan. On such 
issues, the Court expressly observed: 
8. As further support of the Court's decision, the Court notes 
that the broad grant of authority under the Durable Power of Attorney for 
Asset Management was not inconsistent with the entire estate plan 
executed on the same date as an integrated package of estate planning; 
9. While Burrows was not technically an issue of Ida Burrows, it 
is clear that she placed substantial trust in him, as evidenced by the 
Durable Power of Attorney for Asset Management and the overall estate 
plan; . . . . 
(Addendum 1 to Appellant's Brief; R. 275). 
Contrary to Eagar's position, public policy actually strongly favors upholding the 
trial court's decision. To reverse the trial court would significantly erode, and arguably 
even eliminate, any ability to rely on the validity of powers of attorney. In order words, if 
a power of attorney allows an agent to make gifts of personal property, that is exactly 
what it means and what it should allow to take place. The power of attorney shouldn't 
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have to say it more than once,6 or in some other perceived "non-minor" way as Eagar 
suggests, before it becomes valid and enforceable. Eagar is essentially asking the Court 
to write out of the Power of Attorney the gifting of personal property language. If Eagar's 
position is adopted by this Court, parties would no longer be able to have confidence in a 
validly executed power of attorney, and would have a disincentive to take any action 
based upon it for fear of acting in a way that is not actually authorized by the instrument. 
Such a result would have broad sweeping negative effects. Such a result would become 
disruptive to commercial relationships generally, estate planning matters specifically, and 
really any setting in which a power of attorney is utilized. 
Finally, Eagar essentially wants to argue that because Ida was still living at the 
time of the distribution of the personal property into equal shares by random drawing, 
that it was somehow wrongful, sinister, and/or not in Ida's best interest for Ray to act 
6Eagar has suggested that a single reference to gifting in such a "minor" way should 
not give the agent the authority to exercise broad gifting powers. (Appellant's Brief at 8-
9) • When does Eagar think use of gifting language crosses the line from "minor" to 
"major" (or otherwise significant) as she has suggested to this Court? Does it have to be 
contained in the document more than once? How many times does the document have 
to say it? Does it have to be bolded, underlined? To adopt Eagar's position could not 
only have dramatic adverse effects on the interpretation of and reliance upon powers of 
attorney, but upon contract interpretation generally. Written documents would no 
longer mean what they say, and furthermore, and perhaps equally problematic, would be 
entering into some kind of line-drawing interpretation of written instruments that 
involves determining whether a provision is only "minor" or is really intended to be 
something more than that. 
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under the Power of Attorney. If deemed a valid basis to challenge the Power of Attorney 
under the circumstances of this case, every single power of attorney ever executed would 
be of questionable validity. A power of attorney is by its very nature intended to give 
decisionmaking authority to another (the agent) while a person (the principal) is still 
alive. Eagar's argument on this point therefore makes no sense, and would effectively 
turn agency law completely on its head. In short, the public policy considerations in this 
case accordingly support affirming the trial court's decision. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court's decision denying Eagar's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
and granting Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed. The Power 
of Attorney expressly granted Ray Burrows the right to manage Ida's assets, including the 
gifting of her personal property. Ray's actions were consistent with his designations as a 
co-trustee under the Trust and as personal representative of his father's estate. Ray's 
conduct was also entirely consistent with Ralph and Ida's overall estate plan, and 
consistent with any duty of loyalty that he had to Ida. Public policy strongly favors 
upholding the trial court's decision in order to safeguard the validity of a properly 
executed written instrument - the Power of Attorney which granted Ray broad gifting 
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powers and expressly deemed his acts to be those of Ida. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of May, 2007. 
SCALLEY READING BATES 
HANSEN &RASMUSSEN 
Wesley D. Hutchins 
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of May, 2007,1 caused to be sent regular U.S. 
mail, first-class postage pre-paid, two true and exact copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES to the following: 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-1708 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
Addendum 1 Power of Attorney (granted to Eagarfor medical decisions). 
Addendum 2 Document listing the items chosen by the children. 
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Tabl 
•potoer of <3ttotntp 
(Pursuant to Section 75-2-1106, UCA) 
T, IDA B. BUROWS, of 1081 East 7575 South, Midvale Utah, this date officer* ? ^ J<?<=r y 
JL , being of sound mind, willfully and voluntarily appoint KAY EAGAR as my agent and 
Attorney in-Fact, without substitution, with lawful authority to execute a directive on my behalf under 
Section 75-2-1105, governing the care and treatment to be administered to or withheld from me at 
any time after I incur an injury, disease, or illness which renders me unable to give current directions 
to attending physicians and other providers of medical services. 
I have carefully selected my above-named agent with confidence in the belief that this 
person's familiarity with my desires, beliefs, and attitudes will result in directions to attending 
physicians and providers of medical services which would probably be the same as I would give if 
able to do so. 
This Power of attorney shall be and remain in effect from the time my attending physician 
certifies that I have incurred a physical or mental condition rendering me unable to give current 
directions to attending physicians and other providers of medical services as to my care ans treatment. 
$d^fhjLh£* Qj MJlTLdruJ-^L/ 
IDAB.BUROWS 
CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 




On this date of (Dck* 7*-"** /qr?7 . personally appeared before me IDA B. BTJROWS, who 
duly acknowledged to me that she has read and fully understood the foregoing Special Power of 
Attorney, executed the same of her own volition and for the purposes set forth, and that she was 
acting under no constraint or undue influence whatsoever. 
(Seal) 
W O F. Shostone AWB. 
flanofcUT &SOQ2 
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